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Vol. 46

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-VALIDITY OF JUKE Box LICENSING ORDI-

POWER-Plaintiff owned and operated coinoperated phonographs, commonly known as juke boxes, in the City of New
Kensington, Pennsylvania. The city enacted an ordinance making the possession
of coin-operated phonographs or music boxes within the city without a license
illegal. An annual license fee of $25.00 per machine was imposed and violators
were subjected to fine and imprisonment, each day of illegal operation constituting a separate offense. Plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of the
ordinance, alleging that it would cause him irreparable injury and that it was
NANCE AS EXERCISE OF POLICE

uncbnstitutional because beyond the legislative power of the city council. An
injunction was granted by the lower court. On appeal, held, reversed. .ddams
v.City of New Kensington, (Pa. 1947) 55 A. (2d) 392.
While many persons may disagree, juke boxes are undoubtedly aassified
as amusements and there isno question but that amusements are subject to
regulation under the police power.' The theory of regulation of amusements
seems to be best expressed by the maxim salus populi suprema est lex.' Generally
when regulatory measures are imposed to further the general welfare the
courts will defer to the legislative body as to the necessity of the regulations.'

Statutes ' and ordinances 5 regulating the use of juke boxes have been held to
" Apparently on the belief that jurors relying on flimsy excuses will be less
likely to present them in open court, and that the trial judge indetermining excuses
will be less susceptible to outside influences ifhis determination isopen to public
censure. See Report of Committee on Trial by Jury of the American Bar Association
Section on Judicial Administration, 63 A.B.A. Rep. 559 (938) for other methods
used inattempts to get a better quality of jurors.

I See, ingeneral, 3 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-MONS, 2d ed., rev., § 935
et seq. (194-3). "Theatres and other places of public amusement exist wholly under
the authority and protection of state laws . . . therefore, State regulations . . .might
be established as suitable regulations of police."

z

COOLEr, TORTS,

3d

ed., 613

(i9o6). Tiedeman seemed to doubt that the police power extended as far as Judge
Cooley contended, TEDEMAN, LIMrrATIoNs OF POLICE POWER 232 (1886).
law." 13 COKE 139, BACON, MAX. REG. 12.
2'"The will of the people isthe first
It isvirtually impossible to define the exact limits of the general welfare power. As
Justice Harlan stated in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200
U.S. 56i at 592, z6 S.Ct. 341 (19o6), the validity of any given regulation "must
depend upon the circumstances of each case ......
3
3 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL'CoRPORATIONS, 2d ed., rev., § 942 (1943).
4
McCarroll v.Williams, 195 Ark. 715, 114 S.W. (2d) 18 (938); Dornacker
v.,Strutz, 71 N.D. 449, 1 N.W. (2d) 614 (194z); Fox v. Galloway, 74. Ore.
339, 148 P. (ad) 9Z2 (1944); Northwest Amusement Co. v. Galloway, i74 Ore.
362, 148 P. (2d) 931 (1944); Carolina Music Co. v.Query, 192 S.C. 308, 6 S.E.
(ad) 473 (1939); Sheppard v.Giebel, (Texas Civ. App. 1937) 110 S.W. (2d) 166
(937).
' Miller v.City of Memphis, 181 Tenn. 15, 178 S.W. (ad) 38z (1944):
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"RECENT DECISIONS

be valid exercises of the police power and efforts to prohibit use of juke boxes
where liquor is sold have been successful.6 The Constitution of Pennsylvania
provides that the legislature may give cities powers of self government; ' and
the act under which New Kensington is organized confers broad general welfare
powers on the city, but no power to raise revenue by licensing amusements is
granted.' It is dear, in a case such as this, that a city cannot, in the guise of exercising the police power, pass an ordinance which is, in fact, a revenue measure.8
The police power does give a municipality the right to require a license 10
but the fee charged must not exceed the reasonably expected costs of inspection
and supervision." In the principal case plaintiff did not attempt to show that
the ordinance was a revenue measure and, had he done so, the burden would
have been on him to show that the fee was excessive."2 The ordinance provides
that each application for a license shall be referred to the Chief of Police for
inspection and approval but no standard for approval or disapproval is set out.'
Once a license has been obtained the only limitation on the use of the machine
is that it shall not constitute a public nuisance. But surely such use would
have been prohibited even though this ordinance had not been passed. Actually,
then, the ordinance provides no new regulation of juke boxes and in a similar
case the Supreme Court of Illinois said recently, "Where an ordinance contains
no regulatory features it is a revenue measure." '" Viewed in this light, it
seems surprising indeed that the ordinance was not considered to be a revenue
measure and therefore void, even though plaintiff made no such allegation.

Edward S. Tri p. S.Ed.

6
City of DeRidder v. Mangano, 186 La. 129, 171 S. 826 (1936); Zinn v.
City of
Steelville, 551 Mo. 413, 173 S.W. (2d) 398 (1943).
7

Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 193o) Art. 15, § I.

'Third Class City Law, Pa. Laws (1931) p. 932.
9 3 MCQUILIAN, MUNiCIPAI. CoRPo aTIoNs, 2d ed., rev., § 1089"(194-3);
Kittanning Borough v. American Natural Gas Co., 239 Pa. 21o, 86 A. 717 (1913);

Rock v. Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 382, 196 A. 59 (1938).
10 3 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORrATIONS, 2d ed., § 1O91 (1943); American Baseball Club v. Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 311, 167 A. 891 (1933).

"1Ibid.
12 Kittanning Borough v. American Natural Gas Co., 239 Pa. 21o, 86 A. 717
(1913); Rock v. Philadelphia, 127 Pa. Super. 143, 191 A. 669 (1937), affirmed

without opinion 328 Pa. 382, 196 A. 59 (1938); William Laubach & Sons v. Easton,
347 Pa. 542, 32 A. (2d) 881 (1943).
1" Principal case at 397' 4 Lamere v. City of Chicago, 391 Ill. 552 at 564, 63 N.E. (2d) 863 (i945),
wherein an ordinance of the city providing a license fee of $5o per juke box was held
invalid as an exercise of the police power.

